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ABSTRACT
We consider a scenario where an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) serves users that choose digital content among M
Content Providers (CP). In the status quo, these users pay
both access fees to the ISP and content fees to each cho-
sen CP; however, neither the ISP nor the CPs share their
profit. We revisit this model by introducing a different busi-
ness model where the ISP and the CP may have motivation
to collaborate in the framework of caching. The key idea is
that the ISP deploys a cache for a CP provided that they
share both the deployment cost and the additional profit
that arises due to caching. Under the prism of coalitional
games, our contributions include the application of the Shap-
ley value for a fair splitting of the profit, the stability analy-
sis of the coalition and the derivation of closed-form formulas
for the optimal caching policy.
Our model captures not only the case of non-overlapping
contents among the CPs, but also the more challenging case
of overlapping contents; for the latter case, a non-cooperative
game among the CPs is introduced and analyzed to capture
the negative externality on the demand of a particular CP
when caches for other CPs are deployed.
Keywords
Coalitional game theory, Shapley value, Nash Equilibrium
1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The Internet ecosystem is classically described as an in-
terconnection of Autonomous Systems (ASs) [6], exchanging
traffic through peering (free of charge) contracts or customer-
provider contracts. The ASs have been classified by [1]
into five categories: Large Transit Providers, Small Transit
Providers, Access/Hosting providers, Enterprise Customers,
and Content Providers. From an AS perspective, the ASs
that are involved in a customer-provider link with a transit
Internet Service Provider (ISP) pay this latter for the traffic
volume that flows through this link.
From an end user perspective, the current Internet pric-
ing model involves two customer-provider relationships: i)
Access fees, where end users pay a fee to access ISPs for
the connectivity services, based, in general, on flat offers. ii)
Content pricing, where end users pay (directly or indirectly
via advertisement) to the Content Providers (CP).
An alternative Internet economic model has been pro-
posed by Ma et al. in [4]; the idea being that end users
pay for end-to-end services provided by a set of ISPs, and
ISPs collectively share the revenue generated from these cus-
tomers based on a profit distribution mechanism. Notions
from the coalitional game theory [8] have been used for de-
signing the profit distribution mechanism to ensure fairness
and efficiency properties.
Towards this direction, the goal of our work is to analyze
a business model where the ISP and the CPs collaborate by
sharing the cache cost/profit deployment. We use coalitional
game theory to model the interactions between them and we
make the following contributions:
For the case that there is a unique CP: i) We use the
Shapley value [8] to propose a fair splitting of the-due to
caching-profit between the CP and the ISP. ii) We compute
the Nash Bargaining Solution [8] that has also appealing
properties, showing that it coincides with the Shapley value
for our model. iii) We analyze the stability of the Shapley
value, showing under which conditions it belongs to the core
[8] of the game. iv) We compute the optimal caching policy
that maximizes the revenue of both the ISP and the CP.
Our simulations show that there is a significant increase in
the profit of the ISP and the CP with respect to the case
that there is no cache deployment.
For the case that there are multiple CPs: i) We compute
the Shapley value. ii) We analyze the non-cooperative game
[3] that arises due to the competition among the CPs. iii)
We prove that this game admits always a Nash Equilibrium
(NE). iv) We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for
the uniqueness of the NE. v) We propose a best-response
dynamics scheme that converges fast to the NE.
2. BASELINE MODEL: THE CASE OF ONE
CONTENT PROVIDER
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a scenario with one ISP that serves J users
and one CP that offers additional content (movies, sports,
etc.) to these users (see Figure 1); let N be the number of
the items that the CP sells and let P be the price per item.
Each user j pays both access fees to the ISP and content
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Figure 1: Baseline scenario: the case of 1 CP.
fees to the CP. Note that we do not take into consideration
indirect costs (e.g., from ads shown as part of search results).
Then, we compute the profit for the ISP and the CP,
expressed as a utility function that captures the difference
between the income minus the expenses. The utility for the
CP, denoted by UCP, is the difference between the content
fees (i.e., the total demand D for the N items from the J
users multiplied by the price per item P ) that the users of
the ISP pay to him1 minus his operational expenses, denoted
by O. Therefore, we get that: UCP = DP −O.
On the other hand, the utility of the ISP, denoted by UISP,
is the difference between the sum of the access fee πj that
each user j pays to the ISP minus the product of the back-
haul bandwidth B for serving the demand D for the contents
of the CP multiplied by the unit backhaul bandwidth cost
b. Therefore, we get that: UISP =
∑J
j=1 πj −Bb.
2.2 The Impact of Caching
In this section, we examine the impact of caching on the
utility functions of the ISP and the CP. In our context, the
adoption of caching incurs three changes in the model:
• There is a cache deployment cost; for a cache of size
C and with a unit cache cost s, this is equal to sC.
• The total demand D for the N items of the CP will
change; this is due to the fact that the demand is based
on the perceiving Quality-of-Experience (QoE) of the
users and when a cache for the CP is deployed by the
ISP, this has a direct impact on the users’ QoE.
• The backhaul bandwidth B needed will change due to
caching, since some of the requests for the contents of
the CP could be served directly by the cache.
So as to quantify the above factors, we examine the case
that the ISP deploys a cache of size C, storing proactively
the C most popular items out of the N items of the CP.
Let DC be the new demand for the contents of the CP; the
superscript C is an abbreviation for “caching”. The quan-
tity DC equals to: DC = (1 + ∆)D. The parameter ∆
corresponds to a QoE factor that reflects the change on the
demand for the contents of the CP.
We choose the hit ratio as the QoE metric, which is a
standard metric for the efficiency of the cache. The hit ratio
h is defined as the fraction of the number of requests for the
N items that have been found in the cache over the total
number of requests for the N items; clearly, h is a number
between 0 and 1; the larger the hit ratio, the happier are the
users; chances are that they get the content that they want
directly from the cache, without need to wait for the ISP
to communicate with the CP to send the requested content
1We use the pronoun “he” when we refer to the ISP/CP,
implying the owner of the ISP/CP.
back to the ISP. Therefore, this will have a positive impact
on the demand for the contents of the CP.
Based on the above discussion, we define the parameter
∆ to be proportional to the hit rate h as: ∆ = Fh, with F
being a non-negative constant. Clearly, the lower bound of
∆ is zero; in this case, the total demand for the contents of
the CP DC with caching is the same with the total demand
D without caching.
We then compute the formula for the new backhaul band-
width, denoted by BC ; it corresponds to the number of cases
where the request for an item of the CP has not been served
by the cache; these cases correspond to the miss ratio of the
cache of CP, defined as: 1− h. Therefore, BC is computed
by the formula:
BC = B(1− h).
2.3 Update on the Utility Functions
Using the equations of the previous section (a summary
of the notation used so far is provided in Table 1), we can
rewrite the utility functions of the CP and the ISP.
UCCP = (1 + ∆)DP −O,
UCISP =
J∑
j=1
πj − sC −B(1− h)b.
By computing the difference of the utilities with caching
versus without caching, we get:
UCCP − UCP = ∆DP,
UCISP − UISP = −sC + hBb.
It is interesting that the deployment of the cache incurs
always a positive externality for the income of CP, since his
profit will increase (in the worst case, it will remain stable).
On the other hand, the deployment of the cache is beneficial
for the ISP if and only if the backhaul bandwidth savings
hBb are larger than the cache cost deployment sC.
2.4 A Different Business Model: Sharing Cache
Cost/Profit between the ISP and the CP
2.4.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we propose a different business model
where the CP and the ISP are willing to split the cost/profit
that arises due to caching. Therefore, they are willing to
form a coalition, sharing the quantity Φ, which is equal to:
Φ = UCCP − UCP + UCISP − UISP = ∆DP − sC + hBb.
The motivation for the adoption of the model is to ensure
the alignment of the interest of both the ISP and the CP
to deploy a cache. In the status “quo” model where the ISP
pays exclusively for the cache deployment, we have shown
in the previous section that when the cache cost is larger
than the backhaul bandwidth savings, the ISP does not have
motivation to deploy the cache. The question is whether the
participation of the CP into the cache cost deployment will
broaden the number of cases where the ISP is willing to
deploy the cache.
Note that the quantity Φ that corresponds to the addi-
tional cost/profit due to caching for both the ISP and the
CP will be the same either when the ISP pays for the cache
deployment or when the ISP and the CP share the cache
cost/profit (or even when the CP offers the cache for free
Table 1: Summary of the Notation.
Symbol Domain Description
Case 1: No cache is deployed in the ISP network
1 One Content Provider (CP)
N Positive integer Number of items of the CP
D ≥ 0 Total demand for the N items of the CP
P > 0 Price for each item of the CP
O > 0 Fixed expenses of the CP
1 One Internet Service Provider (ISP)
J Positive integer Number of users that the ISP serves
πj > 0 Price that each user j pays to the ISP
B ≥ 0 Backhaul bandwidth needed to serve the demand D
b > 0 Unit backhaul bandwidth cost
Case 2: Cache is deployed in the ISP network
s > 0 Unit cache cost
C ∈ [0, N ] Cache size of the CP in the ISP network
h =
(
C
N
)1−a ∈ [0, 1] Hit rate for the CP
a ∈ (0, 1) Zipf parameter
DC = (1 + ∆)D ≥ 0 New demand for the N items of the CP
BC = B(1− h) ≥ 0 New backhaul bandwidth needed to serve the demand DC
∆ = Fh ≥ 0 Reflects the changes on the demand
F ≥ 0 Constant multiplier
to the ISP network-this is the case with Google nowadays).
The difference through our model lies on how to split this
additional cost/profit.
2.4.2 Shapley Value
To decide how Φ should be split between the CP and
the ISP, we use a well known solution concept from the
coalitional game theory, the Shapley value formula. This
distribution scheme, defined by L. Shapley [8], is an inter-
esting solution in coalition games thanks to its fairness. It is
the unique distribution satisfying the following axioms: effi-
ciency (i.e., the total surplus is allocated), symmetry (i.e.,
players having the same contribution in the coalition are
paid equally), dummy (i.e., players that do not have a con-
tribution in the considered coalition are not paid), and addi-
tivity (i.e., if a game is composed of two sub-games, players
are paid the sum of their shares in both sub-games). There-
fore, each player receives a profit share proportional to its
contribution in the network setting and the added value it
brings to the overall value chain.
In the following Theorem, we compute the Shapley value.
Theorem 1. Let ΦCP be the quantity that the CP receives
and ΦISP be the quantity that the ISP receives after the ap-
plication of the Shapley value on the quantity Φ. Then:
ΦCP =
1
2
(∆DP − sC + hBb),
ΦISP =
1
2
(∆DP − sC + hBb)
Proof. The Shapley value for a player i is defined as:
Φi =
1
N !
∑
R
[u(PRi ∪ (i))− u(PRi )]
where N ! is the number of orders R of the players, PRi is
the set of players in N that precede i in the order R, and
the function u(·) corresponds to the utility function of the
Table 2: Shapley Value for the CP.
Orders Marginal Contribution of the CP
CP, ISP 0
ISP, CP ∆DP − sC + hBb
coalition. In our case, there are two players (the CP and
the ISP) and N = 2 orders per player. In Table 2, we
compute the marginal contribution u(PRi ∪ (i))− u(PRi ) for
each possible order for the CP. By definition, the utility
function of the empty set is zero. When the CP is first,
his marginal contribution is zero, since the coalition has not
been formed yet. When the CP is second, the coalition has
been formed and the marginal contribution of the CP is
equal to the quantity Φ. Therefore:
ΦCP =
1
2
(0 + Φ) =
1
2
(∆DP − sC + hBb).
We can compute the Shapley value of the ISP similarly.
Alternatively, we can exploit the efficiency axiom, i.e., using
the fact that the Shapley value of the ISP is the difference
between the total utility minus the Shapley value of the
CP.
Therefore, the utility functions after the application of the
Shapley value are:
UCCP = DP −O + ΦCP = DP −O +
1
2
(∆DP − sC + hBb),
UCISP =
J∑
j=1
πj −Bb+ ΦISP =
J∑
j=1
πj −Bb+
1
2
(∆DP − sC + hBb).
2.4.3 Nash Bargaining Solution
In this section, we present the outcome of splitting the
cache cost/profit quantity Φ by using a different cooperative
solution concept, the Nash Bargaining solution [8]. Accord-
ing to this, there are two players that demand a portion of
the same good; if the total amount requested by the two
players is less than what is available, then both players get
their request; if not, neither player gets their request and
there is a fixed disagreement outcome d which will be the
result.
Nash proposed that a solution to this problem should sat-
isfy a number of axioms (invariant to affine transformations,
Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant strategies, and
symmetry) and proved that the only formula that satisfies
these axioms is
(ΦCP − dCP)(ΦISP − dISP),
with ΦCP, ΦISP being the portions of the quantity Φ that
the CP and the ISP receives if the bargaining is successful
and dCP, dISP being the disagreement points of the CP and
the ISP.
In our case, the disagreement points correspond to the
utility that the ISP and the CP get without caching. These
are equal to:
dCP = U
C
CP − UCP = ∆DP,
dISP = U
C
ISP − UISP = −sC + hBb.
For these disagreement points, it is trivial to check that
the Nash Bargaining Solution point coincides with the Shap-
ley value (the proof is omitted due to space constraints).
2.4.4 Shapley Value and the Core
Though the Shapley value defines a fair way of dividing
the utility between the (in our case two) members of the
coalition, it ignores issues related to the stability. In other
words, the question is whether the players are willing to form
the coalition given the way that the Shapley value will divide
their profits or some of them prefer to deviate and forming
a different coalition or even they prefer to stay selfish. The
players are willing to stay in a particular coalition if and only
if the utility that they receive in this coalition is at least as
large as the utility that they could earn by forming any other
coalition (or by being selfish). If this is the case, then this
splitting of the profit belongs to the core of the game [8].
In the following Theorem, we prove under which conditions
the Shapley value belongs to the core of the game.
Theorem 2. The Shapley value belongs to the core of the
game if and only if the quantity Φ is non-negative.
Proof. By using the definition of the core of the game,
we examine whether the utilities UCCP and U
C
ISP are at least
as large as in any other possible coalition. Since there are
only two players, the only way to deviate from the coalition
is to be selfish; Therefore, it should be:
UCCP ≥ UCP ⇔ ΦCP ≥ 0,
UCISP ≥ UISP ⇔ ΦISP ≥ 0.
Since ΦCP=ΦISP=
Φ
2
, the theorem holds if and only if Φ is
non-negative.
2.4.5 On the Optimal Caching Policy
In this section, we compute the optimal caching policy,
i.e., the optimal choice of the cache size C that maximizes
the utility functions of the ISP and the CP. In order to
provide a closed-form formula, we need to give an expression
of the hit rate h as a function of the cache size C. We use
the approximation that is given in [2]; the authors assume
that:
• the N items of the CP are of equal size,
• their popularities follow a Zipf(a) distribution with pa-
rameter a being a positive variable that belongs to
(0, 1),
• the number of items N is large
Then, they approximate the cache hit rate h(C), denoted
for simplicity as h, as:
h =
(
C
N
)1−a
.
Theorem 3. The caching size C∗ that maximizes the util-
ity of both the ISP and the CP is:
C? = min
{
N,
a
√
(1− a)(FDP +Bb)Na
s
}
.
.
Proof. We rewrite UCCP and U
C
ISP by using the expression
of the hit rate h.
UCCP = DP −O +
1
2
(
F
(
C
N
)1−a
DP − sC +
(
C
N
)1−a
Bb
)
,
UCISP =
J∑
j=1
πj −Bb+
1
2
(
F
(
C
N
)1−a
DP − sC +
(
C
N
)1−a
Bb
)
.
Then, we get the first derivative of the utilities (denoted by
UC
′
CP and U
C′
ISP) with respect to C and set them equal to zero.
UC
′
CP = 0⇔ C =
a
√
(1− a)(FDP +Bb)Na
s
= C.
Then, UC
′
CP is positive in (0, C
) and negative in (C, N).
We distinguish two cases:
1. If C is larger than N , then the caching size C? that
maximizes UCCP is N .
2. If C is smaller than N , then C? is equal to C.
By combining the cases, we get that:
C? = min
{
N,
a
√
(1− a)(FDP +Bb)Na
s
}
.
.
For the case of the ISP, UC
′
ISP is equal to U
C′
CP and we lead
to the same caching size C?.
Note that the fact that the utilities are maximized for the
same cache size implies that it is indifferent who controls the
cache size (the CP or the ISP).
We did some simulations to measure the average profit
increase per CP and ISP when the optimal caching policy
C∗ is applied. We considered a system where the CP has a
catalog of N = 100 contents characterized by a zipf popu-
larity law of parameter a = 0.8. The ISP has J = 50 users
generating an initial demand of D = 1000. Our results show
an increase of the profits of the ISP and CP by 170% and
150%, respectively, in comparison to the case where there is
no caching.
3. MULTIPLE CONTENT PROVIDERS
3.1 Preliminaries
We now examine the more general case (see Figure 2),
where there is a unique ISP and M CPs that offer additional
content to the J ISP users. This model is generalized as is
for the case of multiple ISPs, provided that the users do not
change ISP.
For the case that there is no caching, we redefine the utility
functions using similar notation with the baseline scenario:
For each CP i, the utility denoted by Ui is equal to:
Ui = DiPi −Oi.
For the ISP, the only difference is that the total back-
haul bandwidth B is the sum of the backhaul bandwidth Bi
needed for the demand for contents of each CP i:
UISP =
J∑
j=1
πj −Bb,B =
M∑
i=1
Bi.
3.2 The Impact of Caching
We study scenarios where the ISP deploys a cache per CP;
we do not consider the case that a cache is shared among
different CPs, since this is not supported due to technical
restrictions and security (cryptography) considerations. We
distinguish two cases:
• When the contents of the CPs are non-overlapping
(e.g., the first CP offers sports events, the second CP
offers movies, the third CP offers music etc.), the base-
line model is generalized as is; since the caches are in-
dependent, we should simply apply the baseline model
for each cache to find out if the ISP and the CP i have
motivation to deploy the cache and, if so, how they
should split the cache cost/profit and which is the op-
timal caching policy.
• When the contents of the CPs are overlapping. In this
case, there is a coupling among the caches; this means
that besides the coalitional game between each CP i
and the ISP, there is a non-cooperative game among
the CPs.
For the rest of the article, we deal only with the overlapping
case. Firstly, we redefine the total demand after caching DCi
to be equal to:
DCi = (1 + ∆i)Di.
As for the parameter ∆i, we assume, as previously, that
it increases linearly with the cache hit rate hi. Moreover,
we assume that it decreases linearly with the sum of the hit
rates of all other CPs; this is due to the fact that the caches
of the other CPs create a negative externality to the demand
of the CP i. Therefore, we get that:
∆i = Fhi − f
∑
j 6=i
hj ,
F ≥ (M − 1)f ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ f ≤ 1
M − 1 .
The global positive constants F and f are set to ensure
that: i) Since the total demand DCi cannot be negative, the
parameter ∆i cannot be lower than -1. ii) If all caches have
the same hit rate, DCi will be at least equal to Di (i.e, the
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Figure 2: The case of multiple Content Providers.
demand with caching will be at least equal to the demand
without caching).
We then define the new backhaul bandwidth needed BCi :
BCi = (1 + Θi)Bi(1− hi).
The difference with the baseline scenario is the introduc-
tion of the term 1 + Θi, with Θi being defined as:
Θi = −f
∑
j 6=i
hj .
The parameter Θi captures the fact that the backhaul
bandwidth BCi is reduced linearly with the sum of the hit
rates of all other caches. Since BCi is a non-negative quan-
tity, the smaller possible value of Θi is -1, which is ensured
by the domain of the global constant f (a summary of the
additional notation is given in Table 3).
Therefore, the utility functions after caching are:
UCi = D
C
i Pi −Oi.
UCISP =
J∑
j=1
πj −
M∑
i=1
sCi −
M∑
i=1
BCi b.
3.3 A Different Business Model: Sharing Cache
Cost/Profit between the ISP and the CP
We extend the business model that we have presented for
the baseline scenario with a unique CP; there is a coalitional
game between the CP i and the ISP with the view to sharing
the cache cost/profit due to the deployment of a cache with
the Ci most popular items of the CP i in the ISP network.
Let Φi be the quantity that corresponds to this sharing,
defined as:
Φi = U
C
i − Ui + UCISP − UISP
= ∆iDiPi − sCi −Bib(−hi −Θihi + Θi).
In the following Theorem, we compute the Shapley value.
Theorem 4. Let ΦCP be the quantity that the CP i re-
ceives and ΦISP be the quantity that the ISP receives after
the application of the Shapley value on Φi. Then:
ΦCP =
1
2
[(∆i + Θi)DiPi − sCi −Bib(−hi −Θihi)]
ΦISP =
1
2
[(∆i −Θi)DiPi − sCi −Bib(−hi −Θihi + 2Θi)]
Proof. The main idea of the proof is similar with the
proof of Theorem 1. In Table 4, we compute the marginal
Table 3: Multiple CPs: Supplementary Notation.
Symbol Domain Description
DCi = (1 + ∆i)Di ≥ 0 New demand for the contents of the CP i
∆i = Fhi − f
∑
j 6=i hj ≥ −1 Reflects the changes on the demand
F ≥ (M − 1)f Global constant multiplier
f ∈ [0, 1
M−1 ] Global constant multiplier
BCi = (1−Θi)Bi(1− hi) ≥ 0 New bandwidth needed to serve the demand DCi
Θi = −f
∑
j 6=i hj [−1, 0] Reflects the changes on the backhaul bandwidth
Table 4: Shapley Value for the CP i.
Orders Marginal Contribution of the CP i
CP i, ISP ΘiDiPi − 0
ISP, CP i Φi +BibΘi
contribution of the CP i for the two possible orders (the
CP is first and the ISP is second, and vice versa). When
the CP i joins first the coalition, his marginal contribution
corresponds to the case that the ISP has not deployed a
cache for his contents; however, the ISP may have deployed
caches for the other CPs. In that case, ∆i = Θi, since the
hit rate hi is zero. Therefore, the marginal contribution is
equal to ΘiDiPi minus the utility of the empty set (which
is zero by definition).
When the CP i joins second the coalition, his marginal
contribution is equal to the quantity Φi minus the change
of the utility of the ISP due to the change of the backhaul
bandwidth, which is equal to the difference BCi −Bi = ΘiBi.
Therefore, by using Table 4 and the definition of the Shap-
ley value, we get that:
ΦCP =
1
2
(ΘiDiPi + Φi +BibΘi) =
1
2
[(∆i + Θi)DiPi − sCi −Bib(−hi −Θihi)].
We can compute the Shapley value of the ISP similarly.
Alternatively, we can exploit the efficiency axiom, stating
that the Shapley value of the ISP is the difference between
the total utility minus the Shapley value of the CP.
3.4 A Non-Cooperative Game between the CPs
3.4.1 Preliminaries
In the previous section, we have analyzed a coalitional
game between the ISP and each CP i to decide upon how
they will distribute the cost/profit that arises due to caching.
In this section, we model the interaction between the CPs
as a non-cooperative game, defined formally as follows:
Definition 1: A normal form non-cooperative game G
with a finite number of players consists of the following
triplet: A set of players M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} and, for each
player i, a set of strategies Si, and a utility function Ui(·).
In our case: i) The players are theM CPs. ii) The strategy
of each player i is the choice of the cache size Ci that belongs
to the closed interval [0, Ni]. iii) The utility function of each
player i is:
Ui = DiPi −Oi +
1
2
(∆i + Θi)DiPi − sCi.
A powerful solution concept in non-cooperative game the-
ory is the pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) [3] which predicts
outcomes of games that are stable, in a sense described be-
low.
Definition 2: The strategy vector s? = [s?1, s
?
2, . . . , s
?
M ] is
a pure NE for a game G if and only if for each player i and
each other feasible strategy si of this player:
Ui(s
?
i , s
?
−i) ≥ Ui(si , s?−i),where
s?−i = [s1, s2, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sM ].
Consequently, a pure NE corresponds to a steady state of a
game in the sense that no player has an incentive to change
unilaterally his own strategy.
3.4.2 Nash Equilibrium Existence
In this section, we show that the non-cooperative game G
fulfils the properties of the Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Theorem
[3] and therefore admits a NE.
Theorem 5. The Game G admits a NE.
Proof. We will use the following proposition, known as
the Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Theorem: Let G be a normal
form game, where, for each player i: (i) The strategy set Si
is compact and convex. ii) The utility function Ui(si, s−i)
is continuous in s−i. iii) The utility function Ui(si, s−i) is
continuous and (quasi-)concave in si. Then, the game G
admits a pure NE.
We will show that these three properties hold in the game
G. Firstly, the strategy set is the closed interval [0, Ni],
which is compact and convex.
Then, we rewrite the utility function Ui:
Ui = DiPi −Oi +
1
2
[(∆i + Θi)DiPi − sCi
−Bib(−hi −Θihi)] = DiPi −Oi+
1
2
Fhi − 2f∑
j 6=i
hj
DiPi − sCi −Bib
−hi + f∑
j 6=i
hjhi

= DiPi −Oi − f
∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−a
DiPi −
1
2
sCi+
1
2
FDiPi +Bib− f∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−a
Bib
 1
N1−ai
C1−ai .
Clearly, Ui is continuous in Ci, as well as in C−i.
As for the third condition, since Ui with respect to Ci is
twice differentiable, it is concave if and only if its second
derivative U
′′
i is non-positive. Indeed, we first compute the
first derivative U
′
i :
U
′
i = −
1
2
s+
1
2
FDiPi +Bib− f∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−a
Bib

· 1
N1−ai
(1− a)C−ai .
Then, we compute the second derivative U
′′
i :
U
′′
i =
1
2
FDiPi +Bib− f∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−a
Bib

· 1
N1−ai
(1− a)(−a)C−a−1i .
Indeed, since
f
∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−a
≤ 1
M − 1(M − 1) = 1,
all product terms are non-negative, besides −a which is
negative, and therefore U
′′
i is always non-positive.
3.4.3 Nash Equilibrium Uniqueness
In this section, we provide a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for the uniqueness of the NE.
Theorem 6. The Game G admits a unique NE if and
only if
F ≥ 1− a
a
max
i
{
NiBib
DiPi
}
.
Proof. We use the following proposition that holds for a
concave game [3]: If a concave game satisfies the dominance
solvability condition
−θ2Ui
θC2i
≥
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣ θ2UiθCjθCi
∣∣∣∣ ,
then the game admits a unique NE.
In the previous theorem, we have computed θ
2Ui
θC2i
, so we
need to compute θ
2Ui
θCjθCi
.
θ2Ui
θCjθCi
=
θ
θCj
(−1
2
s+
1
2
(FDiPi +Bib− f
∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−aBib)
1
N1−ai
(1− a)C−ai ) = (1− a)C
−a
i
1
2
fBib
1
N1−aj
(1− a)C−aj .
Then:
−θ2Ui
θC2i
≥
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣ θ2UiθCjθCi
∣∣∣∣⇔
1
2
[FDiPi +Bib− f
∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−aBib]
1
N1−ai
(1− a)aC−a−1i
≥ (1− a)C−ai
1
2
fBib
∑
j 6=i
1
N1−aj
(1− a)C−aj ⇔
[FDiPi +Bib− f
∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−aBib]aC
−a−1
i ≥
C−ai fBib
∑
j 6=i
1
N1−aj
(1− a)C−aj ⇔
a
Ci
[FDiPi
+Bib− fBib
∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−a] ≥ (1− a)fBib
∑
j 6=i
1
N1−aj
C−aj .
Then, we provide two bounds:
Bib− fBib
∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−a
≥ 0,
∑
j 6=i
1
N1−aj
C−aj ≤M − 1.
For the first bound, we use the fact that f ≤ 1
M−1 and
Cj ≤ Nj . For the second bound, the quantity 1
N1−aj
C−aj
is a decreasing function of Cj , getting the maximum value
at the minimum possible value of Cj . If Cj is at least 1,
then the maximum value of the quantity is 1
N1−aj
, which is
maximized when Nj = 1, i.e., when this CP has just one
item to sell. Therefore, for the M − 1 CPs, the maximum
value of is (M − 1) · 1 = M − 1.
By using the first bound, we get that:
min
 aCi [FDiPi +Bib− fBib∑
j 6=i
(
Cj
Nj
)1−a]
 = aCiFDiPi.
(1)
By using the second bound, we get that:
max{(1− a)fBib
∑
j 6=i
1
N1−aj
C−aj } = (1− a)
1
M − 1Bib(M − 1).
(2)
Since (1) ≥ (2), we get that:
a
Ci
FDiPi ≥ (1− a)
1
M − 1Bib(M − 1)⇔
F ≥ 1− a
a
CiBib
DiPi
⇔ F ≥ 1− a
a
NiBib
DiPi
,
where, in the last step, we also use the fact that the maxi-
mum value of Ci is equal to Ni. Since F is a global constant
and this condition should hold for each CP i, then, we get
that:
F ≥ 1− a
a
max
i
{
NiBib
DiPi
}
.
It is worth mentioning that in order to compute the max-
imum value of F there should be some offline exchange of
messages among the CPs with the ISP being the one that
acts as the mediator. Moreover, though the above condition
is necessary and sufficient for the uniqueness of the NE, F
should be by definition greater than or equal to (M − 1)f .
Therefore, in case that the lower bound for the existence of
the NE is lower than the minimum possible value of F , then
F can get any value in its domain.
The uniqueness of the NE is of interest since we can pre-
dict the outcome of the game. In the next section, we ex-
amine how we can obtain this outcome.
3.4.4 A Best Response Dynamics Scheme
In this section, we propose a best response dynamics scheme
[3], where each CP i updates iteratively his cache size Ci
aiming at maximizing his utility function Ui. Though, in
general, such a scheme may not converge to a NE, in con-
cave games that admit a unique NE, it is guaranteed that it
will converge to the NE.
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Figure 3: Average number of iterations needed so that the
best response dynamics scheme converges to the unique NE.
The cache size at time t + 1 can be computed using an
iterative scheme by taking into consideration the strategies
of all other CPs at time t and is given by the following
formula:
Ci(t+ 1) = max
{
Ni, a
√
(1− a)Ki(t)
sN1−ai
}
,
Ki(t) =
FDiPi +Bib− f∑
j 6=i
(
Cj(t)
Nj
)1−a
Bib
 .
This iterative scheme arises by taking the first derivative
of the utility function Ui and setting it equal to zero in order
to compute the local maximum points; in our case, there is
a unique maximum point (this was the case with the one
CP as well). As usually, a best response dynamics scheme
requires some exchange of messaging among the players to
decide upon their new strategies. In our case, each CP i
needs to know the sum of the hit rates of all other CPs to
update his strategy and the ISP could provide this piece of
information; note that the CPs do not need to know the
exact hit rate of each CP, they suffice to learn their sum.
We have simulated the best response dynamics scheme to
examine the number of iterations needed to converge to the
NE for scenarios that consisting of 5 to 100 CPs. For each
scenario, we have tuned each parameter that affects the NE
convergence starting from very small values and increasing
them to very big values and we have taken all possible com-
binations of them. As shown in Figure 3, the best response
dynamics scheme converges fast to the NE, demanding less
than 8 iterations on average, even when there are 100 CPs.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Using fundamental concepts of game theory to analyze
networked markets is not only useful from a theoretical per-
spective but it can also lead to practical contributions in
network economics problems. In our work, we analyzed the
economics of the widely used idea of caching under the prism
of coalitional game theory, examining whether the ISP and
the CPs have motivation to share the cache cost/profit. By
using standard solution concepts, we showed that a fair and
efficient profit sharing can be achieved. On top of the coali-
tional game, a non-cooperative game among the CPs arises
and, through our analysis, we have shown that a unique NE
exists and we have proposed a scheme that converges to it
in few iterations.
Two promising applications of our work would be in the
context of i) Content Delivery Network Providers that store
the content of the CPs in order to serve the ISP users and
ii) Information-Centric Networks, where content is located
by name instead of by location and every node can cache
and serve the content [9]. Economic aspects for caching
and sharing contents in such networks is an active field of
research; indicative results related to our work in such net-
works with two competing ISPs include revenue-maximizing
caching strategies [5] and NE pricing policies [7].
Other directions for future research include: i) the sta-
bility analysis of the Shapley value for the case in which
there are multiple CPs (e.g., with the view to showing un-
der which conditions this is a convex game [8]), and ii) the
study of the complementary problem of the optimal caching
policy from the side of the ISP where, based on the different
caching policies, network neutrality issues may also appear
and should be analyzed.
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